Journal of medical ethics, I982, and important question of medical ethics'. Professor Anscombe asks, 'can't a doctor sometimes say: 'I do not want to treat this patient . . .' or . . . 'I do not want to prolong this person's life by taking medical measures to do so. I am not saying it is better not to; I would say nothing against another practitioner who would want to. But I don't want to and I don't have to'. Professor Anscombe does not give any indication of the circumstances in which she supposes a doctor can say such a thing. But if this were to be a genuine possibility for doctors, if, for example, they possess the right to say such a thing, then they must be able to say it even where they are say, the only available doctor, so that if they do not treat a particular patient he will die. And here I take it we are inking of patients who could recover and who want to go on living.
Here is a pretty possibility: doctors turning their backs on patients and saying peevishly or capriciously 'I don't want to and I don't have to' and patients dying in droves. Professor Anscombe is certainly correct to detect in my writing 'a blindness to such a possibility' if 'possibility' here indicates that the course of action might be considered morally acceptable.
Professor Anscombe attributes to me the presumption that 'a doctor into whose hands sick people come is ethically obliged, (if he can) to treat them with a view to curing them . . . except in the case where the doctor would justifiably aim at his patient's death'. I think I would accept this presumption, and not only for doctors, but for anyone who could by his actions avert disasters that were threatening others. Professor Anscombe however does not regard this presumption as universally true but again gives no account of the exceptions she has in mind. I have tried elsewhere (7) and albeit incompletely to give an account of where and why this presumption applies, and in the same place I defend a less extreme version of the final presumption she attributes to me. Not that, as in her words, 'action and omission are everywhere equivalent' but rather that actions and omissions with the same consequences are morally equivalent unless they differ in some other way which would carry moral weight quite irrespective of whether it was a feature of an action or of an omission.
Thus in the cases we have been discussing we must consider whether a policy of selective nontreatment is morally preferable to one of active euthanasia. Since the expected and hoped for result of either policy is the painless demise of the patient it would be absurd if one policy was morally impermissible solely on the ground that it involved active rather than passive steps toward the same end. As I argued in my paper, the other differences between the two policies so far from showing that selective non-treatment is morally preferable to active euthanasia, show rather the reverse. Now of course Professor Anscombe finds neither active nor passive euthanasia morally acceptable.
Those who are inclined to agree with her must therefore decide whether it is more morally acceptable to condemn the severely handicapped to months or years of pain and suffering which they could be spared, or to hold that there is nothing wrong with a doctor saying to a patient who wishes to live and who will die without the doctors' help, 'I don't want to. And I don't have to'.
